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I. Introduction
The Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA),
the world governing body for football, was publicly scorned in the
summer of 2015 when the rampant corruption of the international
association was unveiled as a result of the indictments of several top
FIFA officials by the U.S. Department of Justice.1 In May of that
† J.D. Candidate 2020, University of North Carolina School of Law. Articles Editor, North
Carolina Journal of International Law.
1 FIFA Corruption Crisis: Key Questions Answered, BBC NEWS (Dec. 21,
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066 [https://perma.cc/CL6U4NE6] [hereinafter FIFA Corruption Crisis]. The sport referenced here as football is
called soccer in the United States. FIFA, the world governing body for football, is based
in Zurich, Switzerland and is formally registered as a non-profit association governed by
Swiss law. Henrik Böhme, FIFA’s Controversial Business Model, DEUTSCHE WELLE
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year, at the request of U.S. authorities, the Swiss police descended
upon a swanky Zurich hotel to arrest seven FIFA executives.2
Between May and December of 2015, more than thirty FIFA
officials and associates were indicted by the U.S. Department of
Justice for charges of corruption, including racketeering, wire fraud
conspiracies, money laundering conspiracies, and bribery.3 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) began investigating potential
FIFA corruption three years before the 2015 indictments in response
to the suspect bidding process for the Russia 2018 and the Qatar
2022 World Cups, only to later widen the investigation to include
the past twenty years of FIFA dealings.4 In issuing indictments
stemming from FIFA leaders’ corrupt practices, U.S. authorities
alleged in part that U.S. banks were involved in the money transfers
tainted by the misconduct of FIFA officials.5 Alongside the ongoing
FBI inquiry into FIFA corruption, the Swiss Attorney General
launched a separate criminal investigation.6
FIFA is the governing body responsible for running
international football, organizing the World Cup, and generating
“billions of dollars in revenue from corporate sponsors,
broadcasting rights[,] and merchandising.”7 As such, the corruption
of their vast international affairs has had and will continue to have
widespread consequences, ranging from criminal prosecutions of
top executives and FIFA associates to potentially indefinite internal
FIFA bans of involved individuals.8 Already, former FIFA
President Sepp Blatter and Union of European Football Association
(UEFA) President Michel Platini have been “found guilty of
breaches surrounding a £1.3m ($2m) ‘disloyal payment’ made to
Platini in 2011,” and FIFA has openly expressed that Blatter and
(May 27, 2015), https://www.dw.com/en/fifas-controversial-business-model/a-18479441
[https://perma.cc/2A6H-5NNN].
2 Id.
3 Id. See also Press Release, United States Dep’t of Justice, Nine FIFA Officials &
Five Corp. Execs. Indicted for Racketeering Conspiracy Corruption (May 27, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-32897066justice.gov/opa/pr/nine-fifa-officialsand-five-corporate-executives-indicted-racketeering-conspiracy-and
[https://perma.cc/8PD8-WBBJ] [hereinafter Nine FIFA Officials].
4 FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note 1.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 Id.
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Platini “demonstrated an ‘abusive execution’ of their positions.”9
Independent of the criminal charges, FIFA internally punished
Blatter and Platini with the decision by the FIFA Ethics Committee
to ban both leaders from all football-related activities for eight
years.10 The ongoing Swiss and U.S. criminal investigations and the
growing number of FIFA officials and associates proven guilty of
corrupt practices “cast doubt over the transparency and honesty for
the process of allocating World Cup tournaments, electing
[officials], and the administration of funds . . . .”11 In spite of the
doubts and pressures from external sources, FIFA has not given up
the fight for its credibility as a capable governing body for the
world’s most popular sport.12
Further motivated by the ongoing criminal cases, FIFA has
moved forward with reform efforts that aim to combat corruption.13
FIFA is precariously positioned for further corruption to occur in
the future due to the following considerations: (1) FIFA reform is
predominantly guided by internal mechanisms for change within the
organization; (2) external governmental bodies have minimal
opportunities for review of FIFA practices; and (3) FIFA
disciplinary measures have limited negative consequences for FIFA
rule violations.14 Nevertheless, FIFA’s 2018 reforms of the FIFA
Code of Ethics represent a strong initial attack on corruption.15
Moving forward, however, FIFA reform efforts should focus on
building an internal culture of compliance, integrity, and public
transparency.
This Note will proceed in six parts. Part I will briefly explain
the Qatar controversy over the bidding process to host the 2022
World Cup and how FIFA responded internally to the allegations of
Id.
Id.
11 FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note 1.
12 See generally Amendments to the FIFA Statutes and Regulations, FIFA (July 27,
2018),
https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/1645-amendments-to-the-fifa-statutesand-the-regulations-governing-the-applicati.pdf?cloudid=ncxm7twuakafdkf4yijl
[https://perma.cc/T92E-PM2G] [hereinafter Amendments].
13 Id.
14 See generally id. (amendments to FIFA regulations); FIFA Statutes, infra note 32
(laying out the governance structure of FIFA); FIFA Disciplinary Code, infra note 49
(enumerating the responsibilities of the Disciplinary Committee); FIFA Code of Ethics,
infra note 58 (outlining the powers of the FIFA Ethics Committee).
15 Id.
9

10
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corruption. Part II will describe FIFA’s governance structure and
the duties allocated to each FIFA body. Part III will summarize the
amendments to the FIFA Code of Ethics that are most closely aimed
at combatting corruption within FIFA. Part IV will present a
sampling of recent recommendations for FIFA reform described in
other law journals, and Part V will respond directly to the strengths
and shortcomings of the commentators’ recommendations in light
of FIFA’s recent reform efforts. Part VI will then recommend
furthering FIFA reform through public transparency and taking
steps toward creating an anti-corruption culture within FIFA.
II. The Qatar Controversy and FIFA’s Response
FIFA’s reputation has been tainted by corruption for decades.16
Although the FIFA Ethics Committee has historically monitored
and resolved many specific instances of corruption, the most recent
claims of bribery and corruption that swirled around the bidding
process to host the 2018 and 2022 World Cup competitions have not
been so easily brushed away by FIFA governance.17 In December
2010, the final vote for the hosting rights to the 2022 World Cup
resulted in eight votes cast for the United States and fourteen votes
cast for Qatar.18 In the wake of bribery and corruption claims prior
to, during, and after the vote, a Qatar victory to host the 2022 World
Cup added fuel to an already raging wildfire of controversy. The
questionable nature of a Qatar victory was especially enflamed by
the lack of logic in the choice of Qatar as host nation, considering
the obstacles of weather conditions, suspected human rights
violations, and a lack of existing football facilities.19 Although
sparked by the controversial bid for Qatar, the United States and
Swiss inquiries were not the only investigative efforts to sniff out
misconduct.20
In light of the controversy over the Qatar victory, FIFA moved

16 See Jack Rollin, The FIFA Corruption Scandal, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Oct.
17, 2016), https://www.britannica.com/topic/FIFA-Corruption-Scandal-The-2076091
[https://perma.cc/T7PY-HU7V].
17 See Kate Youd, Comment, The Winter’s Tale of Corruption: The 2022 FIFA
World Cup in Qatar the Impending Shift to Winter, and Potential Legal Actions against
FIFA, 35 NW J. INT’L L. & BUS. 167, 171 (2014).
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 Id.

2019

A FIFA SOAP OPERA

5

forward with its own internal investigation of the suspect bidding
process.21 On November 13, 2014, the investigatory chamber for
the FIFA Ethics Committee reviewed the relevant bidding and
award process in light of the FIFA Code of Ethics and other FIFA
rules and regulations.22 The investigatory chamber prepared its
“Report on the Inquiry into the 2018/2022 FIFA World Cup Bidding
Process,” and in response, the chairman of the adjudicatory chamber
issued an accompanying statement.23 The statement’s cover letter
stressed the concern to “strike a balance between the public’s –
legitimate – demand for transparency with regard to the occurrences
related to the relevant World Cup bidding and award process and
the legal framework [of] the Ethics Committee[’s]” operations,
particularly the provisions on confidentiality in the FIFA Code of
Ethics that protects the integrity of information disclosed during
Ethics proceedings.24 The report was divided into three relevant
sections: (1) the bidding process; (2) personalized information on
individuals and bidders (with some restrictions); and (3)
recommendations.25 In addition to numerous recommendations to
reform the World Cup bidding process for future host selections, on
November 18, 2014, then chairman of the adjudicatory chamber of
the
FIFA
Ethics
Committee,
Hans-Joachim
Eckert,
“recommend[ed] to the FIFA President – in line with the FIFA Code
of Ethics – that a criminal complaint be lodged with the Office of
21 See generally Press Release, Hans Joachim Eckert, Statement of the Chairman of
the Adjudicatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee on the Report on the Inquiry
into the 2018/2020 FIFA World Cup™Bidding Process prepared by the Investigatory
Chamber
of
the
FIFA
Ethics
Committee
(Nov.
13,
2014),
https://imgresources.fifa.com/image/upload/oixdbzuh94ae4p2w41lomm/document/affed
eration/footballgovernance/02/47/41/75/statementchairmanadjcheckert_neutral.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KK75-WY93] [hereinafter Eckert Statement].
22 Id.
23 Id. The FIFA Ethics Committee is one of three judicial bodies of FIFA, and it is
further subdivided into an investigatory chamber, which leads the investigation of alleged
misconduct, and an adjudicatory chamber, which follows an adjudicatory process to
formally decide the issue and pronounce punishments when necessary. See infra Part IIB2.
24 Cover
Letter to Eckert Statement, FIFA, at 2 (Nov. 13, 2014),
httpss://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/footballgovernance/02/47/41/88/st
atementcoverletter_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXR4-28UL] [hereinafter Eckert Cover
Letter].
25 Ethics Committee Milestones (2012-2018), FIFA, at 7 (Sept. 5, 2018),
https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/ethics-committee-milestones-2012-20162741972.pdf?cloudid=flai7jvu5ah88alhscjd [https://perma.cc/6HWD-264Z] [hereinafter
Milestones].
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the Attorney General of Switzerland in Berne.”26
Concurrent with the Swiss criminal investigation, the U.S.
Department of Justice proceeded with its independent investigation,
resulting in the indictment of more than thirty FIFA officials and
associates by the U.S. Department of Justice in late 2015 for charges
of corruption, including racketeering, wire fraud, money
laundering, and bribery.27 Although initially an investigation into
the bidding process resulting in the Qatar victory to host the 2022
World Cup, the FBI later widened the investigation to include the
last several decades of corrupt FIFA dealings.28 In response to the
facts presented by the U.S. investigation and on the basis of
inquiries of the investigatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics
Committee, the chairman of the adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA
Ethics Committee implemented bans against numerous individuals
involved in the corruption from carrying out any football-related
activities at the national and international levels.29 For example,
FIFA leaders Sepp Blatter and Michel Platini were under
investigation by the investigatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics
Committee for a multi-million dollar payment from FIFA to Platini
that occurred back in February 2011.30 As a result of the FIFA
internal investigation, on December 21, 2015, Blatter and Platini
were officially banned from all national and international footballrelated activities for eight years.31
III.

FIFA Organization and Duties

A. FIFA Governing Bodies
According to the most recent April 2015 update to the FIFA
Statutes, FIFA governance is organized into separate governing
bodies: the FIFA Congress (the legislative body), the FIFA
Executive Committee (the executive body), the general secretariat
(the administrative body), and other standing or ad hoc committees
that provide advice and assistance to the FIFA Executive

26
27

Id.
Nine FIFA Officials, supra note 3. See also FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note

1.
28
29
30
31

FIFA Corruption Crisis, supra note 1.
Milestones, supra note 25, at 10–14.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 14.
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Committee in the fulfillment of its duties.32
1. FIFA Congress
The FIFA Congress “is responsible for adopting and amending
the [FIFA] Statutes, the Regulations Governing the Application of
the Statutes and the Standing Orders of the Congress.”33 In order to
validate a vote to amend the FIFA Statutes, an absolute majority
quorum of FIFA Members eligible to vote must be present, and if
the proposal to adopt or amend the FIFA Statutes is approved by
three-quarters or more of the eligible Members, then the proposal
will be adopted by the FIFA Congress.34 A simple majority of valid
votes is all that is required to adopt or amend the Regulations
Governing the Application of the Statutes and the Standing Orders
of Congress.35 All elections of FIFA officials are conducted by
secret ballot at a session of the FIFA Congress.36
2. FIFA Executive Committee
The FIFA Executive Committee is comprised of twenty-five
members, including the President (elected by the FIFA Congress),
eight vice-presidents (elected by the Confederations and then
installed by the FIFA Congress), one female member (elected by the
FIFA Congress), and fifteen other members (elected by the
Confederations and installed by the FIFA Congress).37 The six
Confederations under the umbrella of FIFA with the power to elect
members of the FIFA Executive Committee are widely known by
their acronyms: CONMEBOL, AFC, UEFA, CAF, CONCACAF,
and OFC.38

32 FIFA,
FIFA
STATUTES:
APRIL
2015
EDITION
20
(2015),
https://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/affederation/generic/02/58/14/48/2015fifastatut
esen_neutral.pdf [https://perma.cc/CGM5-WX7P] [hereinafter FIFA Statutes].
33 Id. at 25.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 24, 26.
37 Id. at 28.
38 FIFA Statutes, supra note 32, at 29. “Members that belong to the same continent
have formed the following Confederations, which are recognised by FIFA: a)
Confederación Sudamericana de Fútbol – CONMEBOL b) Asian Football Confederation
– AFC c) Union des associations européennes de football – UEFA d) Confédération
Africaine de Football – CAF e) Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean
Association Football – CONCACAF f) Oceania Football Confederation – OFC.” Id. at
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The FIFA Executive Committee is responsible for all decisionmaking that does not fall “within the sphere of responsibility of the
[FIFA] Congress or are not reserved for other bodies by law or
under [the] Statutes.”39 One of the enumerated responsibilities of
the FIFA Executive Committee is the appointment of the “place and
dates of the final competitions of FIFA tournaments and the number
of teams taking part from each Confederation,” with the exception
of the decisions regarding the host country of the World Cup.40 The
President is the legal representative of FIFA with three primary
responsibilities: (1) “implementing the decisions passed by the
Congress and the Executive Committee through the general
secretariat;” (2) “supervising the work of the general secretariat;”
and (3) maintaining “relations between FIFA and the
Confederations Members, political bodies and international
organizations.”41
3. FIFA Standing Committees
Of the twenty-six standing committees, the most pertinent are
the Finance Committee, the Audit and Compliance Committee, the
Legal Committee, and the Associations Committee. The Finance
Committee monitors FIFA’s financial management, advises the
Executive Committee on financial matters, and analyzes the budget
and financial statements that are submitted to the Executive
Committee for approval.42 The Audit and Compliance Committee
is responsible for “ensur[ing] the completeness and reliability of the
financial accounting and reviewing the financial statements, the
consolidated financial statement and the external auditor’s report.”43
The Legal Committee analyzes “basic legal issues relating to
football and the evolution of the Statutes and regulations of FIFA,
the Confederations and Members.”44 The Associations Committee
oversees the “relations between FIFA and its Members as well as

17.
Id.
Id. at 30.
41 Id. at 31. The general secretariat performs the administrative work of FIFA under
the guidance and direction of the Secretary General, the chief executive of the general
secretariat. Id. at 51.
42 Id. at 35.
43 Id.
44 FIFA Statutes, supra note 32, at 41.
39
40
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the Members’ compliance with the FIFA Statutes and draw[s] up
proposals for optimum cooperation.”45
B. FIFA Judicial Governance
In addition to the above governing bodies, FIFA has three
judicial bodies: (1) the Disciplinary Committee; (2) the Ethics
Committee; and (3) the Appeal Committee.46
The FIFA
Disciplinary Code governs the FIFA Disciplinary Committee, and
the FIFA Code of Ethics governs the FIFA Ethics Committee.47 The
FIFA Appeal Committee is governed by both the FIFA Disciplinary
Code and the FIFA Code of Ethics.48
1. FIFA Disciplinary Committee
The FIFA Disciplinary Committee has the authority to “sanction
any breach of FIFA regulations which does not come under the
jurisdiction of another body.”49 The object and purpose of the FIFA
Disciplinary Code is to describe the infringements of FIFA rules,
determine the resulting sanctions, regulate the organization and
function of the decision-making bodies, and define the procedures
for interacting with those bodies.50 The FIFA Disciplinary Code has
broad scope of authority to regulate.51 The FIFA Disciplinary Code
applies in every circumstance that involves any match or
competition organized by FIFA, any breach of the statutory
objectives of FIFA, especially in regard to forgery, corruption, and
doping, and any breach of FIFA regulations that are not the
responsibility of another body.52 FIFA regulations include “the

Id.
Id. at 43.
47 Id. at 44–45.
48 Id. at 45.
49 FIFA
Disciplinary
Code,
FIFA,
at
10
(May
9,
2017),
https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-disciplinary-code500276.pdf?cloudid=koyeb3cvhxnwy9yz4aa6
[https://perma.cc/QS9J-EW6C]
[hereinafter FIFA Disciplinary Code]. “The Disciplinary Committee is responsible for: a)
sanctioning serious infringements which have escaped the match officials’ attention; b)
rectifying obvious errors in the referee’s disciplinary decisions; c) extending the duration
of a match suspension incurred automatically by an expulsion; d) pronouncing additional
sanctions, such as a fine.” Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
50 Id.
51 See id.
52 Id. at 10–11.
45
46
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statutes, regulations, directives and circulars of FIFA as well as the
Laws of the Game issued by the International Football Association
Board.”53 Typical disciplinary measures include: a warning, a
reprimand, a fine, a return of rewards, an expulsion, a forfeit, a ban
from a stadium, a ban on taking part in any football-related activity,
and others of similar consequence.54 With respect to corruption, the
FIFA Disciplinary Code mandates the following:
Anyone who offers, promises or grants an unjustified advantage
to a body of FIFA, a match official, a player or an official on
behalf of himself or a third party in an attempt to incite it or him
to violate the regulations of FIFA will be sanctioned:
a) with a fine of at least CHF 10,000,
b) with a ban on taking part in any football-related
activity, and
c) with a ban on entering any stadium.55

Additionally, “[p]assive corruption (soliciting, being promised
or accepting an unjustified advantage) will be sanctioned in the
same manner[,] [and] in serious cases and in the case of repetition,
sanction 1b) may be pronounced for life.”56 Furthermore, all assets
involved in committing the infringement will be confiscated and
used for football development programs.57
2. FIFA Ethics Committee
The FIFA Ethics Committee is composed of an investigatory
chamber and an adjudicatory chamber, and FIFA Ethics Committee
proceedings include first an investigation and then an adjudicatory
process.58 The FIFA Ethics Committee has the authority to
pronounce sanctions enumerated in the FIFA Code of Ethics, the

Id. at 12.
54 Id. at 14. Fines may be issued in Swiss francs (CHF) or U.S. dollars (USD) and
may be no less than CHF 200 and no more than CHF 1,000,000. Id. at 15.
55 FIFA Disciplinary Code, supra note 49, at 33.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 FIFA
Code
of
Ethics,
FIFA,
at
10
(June
10,
2018),
https://resources.fifa.com/image/upload/fifa-code-of-ethics-2018-version-takes-effect12-08-18.pdf?cloudid=uemlkcy8wwdtlll6sy3j
[https://perma.cc/D5LF-AVQA]
[hereinafter FIFA Code of Ethics].
53
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FIFA Disciplinary Code, or the FIFA Statutes.59 The FIFA Code of
Ethics applies to “any conduct . . . that damages the integrity and
reputation of football and in particular to illegal, immoral and
unethical behavior of . . . all officials and players as well as match
agents and intermediaries.”60 Persons bound by the FIFA Code of
Ethics may be punished for a breach of the Code or any other FIFA
rule or regulation with one or more of the following sanctions: a
warning, a reprimand, compliance training, a return of awards, a
fine, social work, a match suspension, a ban from dressing rooms
and/or the substitutes’ bench, a ban on entering the stadium, or a
ban on taking part in any football-related activity.61 The FIFA Code
of Ethics covers such areas of misconduct as commission, forgery
and falsification, abuse of position, bribery, and misappropriation
of funds.62 Additionally, a “Duty to Report” is built into the FIFA
Code of Ethics such that persons bound by the Code who become
aware of infringements are required to directly inform the
investigatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee or risk a fine
of at least CHF 10,000 and a ban from taking part in any footballrelated activity for a maximum of two years.63
3. FIFA Appeal Committee
The purpose of the FIFA Appeal Committee is to decide
“appeals against any of the Disciplinary Committee’s decisions that
FIFA regulations do not declare as final or referable to another
body.”64 The FIFA Appeal Committee may hear appropriate
appeals of decisions of the adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics
Committee that relate to infringements concerning the manipulation
of football matches or competitions.65
C. Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)
The FIFA Statutes authorize the independent Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS), headquartered in Lausanne,
Switzerland, to “resolve disputes between FIFA, Members,
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 11.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 19–23.
Id. at 16.
FIFA Disciplinary Code, supra note 49, at 41.
FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 58, at 51.
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Confederations, Leagues, Clubs, Players, Officials, intermediaries
and licensed match agents.”66 The Confederations, Members,
Leagues and their members and affiliates, in addition to
intermediaries and licensed match agents, are also obligated by the
FIFA Statutes to recognize CAS as an independent judicial
authority and to comply with CAS decisions.67
CAS serves as the independent, international court of last resort
for most sports matters.68 However, FIFA “[r]ecourse may only be
made to CAS after all other internal channels have been
exhausted.”69 CAS proceedings are governed by the CAS Code of
Sports-Related Arbitration, but in deciding a case, CAS will
primarily apply the relevant FIFA regulations, and when necessary,
Swiss law.70 With few exceptions, final decisions passed by FIFA’s
legal bodies or decisions passed by Confederations, Members, or
Leagues may be appealed to CAS within 21 days of notification of
the final decision in question.71 Apart from CAS, “[r]ecourse to
ordinary courts of law is prohibited unless specifically provided for
in the FIFA regulations[, and] [r]ecourse to ordinary courts of law
for all types of provisional measures is also prohibited.”72 In the
large majority of circumstances, in the absence of a FIFA regulation
or binding legal provision that allows or stipulates recourse to an
ordinary court of law, disputes will be handled by an independent
and duly constituted arbitration tribunal recognized by FIFA,
Confederation rules, or by CAS.73
IV. FIFA 2018 Reforms
In the interest of “safeguard[ing] the integrity and reputation of
football worldwide . . . [and] protect[ing] the image of football from
FIFA Statutes, supra note 32, at 47.
Id. at 49.
68 See History of the CAS, TAS/CAS, https://www.tas-cas.org/en/generalinformation/history-of-the-cas.html [https://perma.cc/NPS3-89JG].
69 FIFA Statutes, supra note 32, at 47.
70 Id.
71 Id. (“CAS . . . does not deal with appeals rising from: (a) violations of the Laws of
the Game; (b) suspensions of up to four matches or up to three months (with the exception
of doping decisions); (c) decisions against which an appeal to an independent and duly
constituted arbitration tribunal recognized under the rules of an Association or
Confederation may be made.”).
72 Id. at 49.
73 FIFA Statutes, supra note 32, at 49.
66
67
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jeopardy or harm as a result of immoral or unethical methods and
practices,” FIFA implemented reform measures in the aftermath of
the 2015 controversies.74 On June 13, 2018, the sixty-eighth FIFA
Congress approved amendments to the FIFA Statutes that came into
effect August 12, 2018.75 In addition to the amended FIFA Statutes,
the FIFA Congress reviewed the 2012 FIFA Code of Ethics, through
the collaborative effort of the chairpersons and members of the
investigatory and adjudicatory chambers of the FIFA Ethics
Committee and representatives of the Confederations, which
resulted in the updated 2018 version of the FIFA Code of Ethics –
approved by the FIFA Council on June 10, 2018 and admitted into
force on August 12, 2018.76 With the intention of “enabl[ing] the
football world to have a standardised and generally recognised
common agreement as to the conduct that is to be considered
inappropriate by football officials,” FIFA mandated that its member
associations and confederations include the updated provisions of
the 2018 FIFA Code of Ethics in their respective applicable
regulations.77
Although there were many amendments to the FIFA Code of
Ethics, the following updates most directly combat the internal
corruption that surfaced in 2015: (1) the FIFA Code of Ethics now
empowers the FIFA Ethics Committee to investigate and judge the
conduct of all persons bound by the FIFA Code of Ethics; (2) the
amendments further specify the degree of sanctions and add a new
disciplinary measure in the form of compliance training; and (3) the
updated Code additionally provides that most of the FIFA Ethics
Committee decisions may be appealed directly before the CAS.78
The revisions to the FIFA Code of Ethics now
provide[] for an exclusive competence of the Ethics Committee to
investigate and judge the conduct of all persons bound by the
Code of Ethics where such conduct: [(1)] [h]as been committed
by an individual who was elected, appointed or assigned by FIFA
to exercise a function; [(2)] [d]irectly concerns their FIFA-related
duties or responsibilities; or [(3)] [i]s related to the use of FIFA

74
75
76
77
78

Amendments, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

14

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLV

funds.79

If the concerned conduct falls outside of the above designated
scenarios, the member associations of FIFA and the Confederations,
depending on the scope of the relevant conduct, may have the
capability to lead their own investigations and render judgments on
the matter.80
However, if the member association or the
Confederation fails to act within three months from the time that the
FIFA Ethics Committee receives notice of the matter, the FIFA
Ethics Committee reserves the right to exert its authority.81
In an effort to promote transparency and legal clarity in ethics
proceedings, the FIFA Code of Ethics was amended to further
specify the degree of sanctions, such that “[e]ach material article
contains either a minimum or a maximum sanction, which is
binding upon the Ethics Committee with the exception of cases with
repeated breaches.”82 Additionally, the FIFA Code of Ethics now
includes a new disciplinary measure, compliance training to be
imposed at the discretion of the FIFA Ethics Committee, which is
intended “to ensure that the football officials concerned understand
and adhere to the applicable laws and regulations that apply to their
roles.”83 Finally, rather than a requirement that the FIFA Ethics
Committee decisions must first be appealed to the FIFA Appeal
Committee, the updated FIFA Code of Ethics provides that “most
of the decisions of the Ethics Committee may be appealed directly
before CAS.”84 However, as mentioned in Part II(B), decisions of
the FIFA Ethics Committee that specifically concern match
manipulation will still first be appealed to the FIFA Appeal
Committee, and then, where necessary, may be appealed to CAS.85
V.
Commentators’ Recommendations
In concluding that FIFA has for some time needed internal
reform in order to combat the corrupt practices of its individual
members and member institutions, many commentators have
79
80
81
82
83
84
85

Id.
Amendments, supra note 12.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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weighed in on the debate and have expressed their opinions on how
to best go about the process of reform.86
Ali Eghbal, a graduate of Southwestern Law School and
currently a law clerk for the presiding judge of the Los Angeles
County Juvenile Court, argues for the implementation of the policy
behind the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) in order to
curb the corruption in FIFA.87 “The Administrative Procedure Act
successfully solved the separation of powers and transparency
issues stemming from federal administrative agencies in the United
States.”88 According to Eghbal’s recommendation, FIFA would
benefit from mimicking various features of the APA, such as (1) the
“organizationally independent” role of the “hearing examiner,” or
the adjudicator who hands down decisions in regard to disputes; (2)
the importance placed on public transparency; and most
importantly, (3) the adjudicatory decision’s subjection to review in
the federal court system.89
In commenting on the “culture of corruption” within FIFA
governance, Professor Bruce W. Bean of Michigan State University
College of Law suggests that the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of
1977 (FCPA) be amended to include FIFA on its list of international
organizations subject to the provisions of the FCPA.90 The FCPA
“criminalizes bribes paid to foreign officials, including officials of
‘public international organizations.’”91 As such, if FIFA was
included on the FCPA list of international organizations, “bribes
paid to or extorted by FIFA officials would be subject to the
provisions of the FCPA, and anyone with a connection to the United
States paying such a bribe would be paying to an FCPA ‘foreign
official’ and thus would be subject to the criminal provisions of the
FCPA.”92 In a later essay, Professor Bean readdresses the
86 See, e.g., Ali Eghbal, Note, Enough Is Enough: FIFA Must Incorporate Principles
from the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 to Combat Ongoing Executive Committee
Corruption, 22 SW. J. INT’L L. 385, 400 (2015) (arguing that the implementation of the
policy behind the Administration Procedure Act of 1946 will help curb FIFA corruption).
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id. at 402–03.
90 Bruce W. Bean, An Interim Essay on FIFA’s World Cup of Corruption: The
Desperate Need for International Corporate Governance Standards at FIFA, 22 ILSA J
INT’L & COMP L 367, 391 (2016) [hereinafter Bean, An Interim Essay].
91 Id. at 390.
92 Id.
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continuing problem of FIFA corruption by recommending a short
list of approaches to reform, including the following: (1) self-reform
by FIFA; (2) Swiss government action; (3) pressure, including
prosecutions, from host governments; (4) pressure from sponsors;
(5) action by the international community through a convention;
and/or (6) action from the United Nations or another
intergovernmental organization.93
In a note for the Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal,
then Senior Notes Editor Alexander Mandel, who currently
practices as an associate with Greenberg Traurig in New York,
recommended a “complete overhaul of [FIFA’s] current corporate
structure” that would need to be set out in a series of long-term
proposals and led by an independent board of directors.94 According
to Mandel, the implementation of an independent board of directors
“will help attack [FIFA’s] corruption by laying out specific tasks of
the members and increasing the power that these executives have
within the organization.”95 Mandel further concludes that true
reformation will not occur within FIFA until there is “more
accountability and more transparency amongst the entire
organization.”96
VI.

Response to Commentators’ Proposals in Light of
FIFA’s Reform Efforts
In review of the above recommendations for FIFA reform, it is
evident that FIFA has historically lacked public transparency as
well as adequate measures for checks and balances within FIFA
leadership and management. However, a closer look at the FIFA
rules and regulations, especially as they concern the most recent
reforms to the FIFA Code of Ethics and the efforts of FIFA
governance to create a new image of transparency, reveals strides in
the right direction for FIFA in the war against internal corruption.97
Granted, it will likely take many years of consistent effort for a

93 Bruce W. Bean, FIFA Is Corruption: What Is To Be Done?, 27 MICH. ST. INT’L L.
REV. 197, 243 (2019) [hereinafter Bean, FIFA Is Corruption].
94 Alexander Mandel, Note, Fixing Soccer: Changing FIFA’s Corporate
Governance Structure in Response to the Current FIFA Corruption Scandal, 35 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 449, 479 (2017).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Amendments, supra note 12.
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culture of transparency and accountability to pervade an
international organization with so far a reach as FIFA.
At least one of the above recommendations has already been
implemented to some degree by FIFA.98 In reference to Ali
Eghbal’s Enough Is Enough, the suggested creation of an
“organizationally independent” role for the “hearing examiner” in
reflection of a feature of the APA seems practically moot when
FIFA has a fully-formed and fully-functional Ethics Committee that
serves as an independent body for purposes of investigating and
adjudicating potential conduct violations, including corrupt
practices.99 One potential way to improve upon the idea of a more
“organizationally independent” role100 for the FIFA Ethics
Committee is to amend the FIFA Statutes to provide that at least a
select number of the members of the investigatory chamber and
adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee include legal
professionals with experience and familiarity with sports disputes,
who are not otherwise already involved with FIFA, to fill nonvoting advisory positions.101 As such, the FIFA Code of Ethics
should be amended to allow for the existence of the proposed thirdparty advisory positions.102
Other commentary that stresses the external regulation of FIFA
as the cure-all for corruption overlooks the unique nature of sports
law in the context of corporate corruption. For example, Ali
Eghbal’s suggestion – to implement a stronger checks and balances

98 See generally Independent Ethics Committee, FIFA, https://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/who-we-are/committees/committee/1882034/ [https://perma.cc/4UZL-JWTM].
99 See FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 58, at 26 (“The members of the Ethics
Committee shall manage their investigations and proceedings and render their decisions
entirely independently and shall avoid any third-party influence. The members of the
Ethics Committee and their immediate family members shall not belong to any other
judicial body within FIFA, to the FIFA Council or to any standing committee of FIFA.
The members of the Ethics Committee shall not belong to any other FIFA bodies.”).
100 Eghbal, supra note 86, at 402–03.
101 In recent history, FIFA has shown a willingness to reform the organizational
independence of the Ethics Committee. In 2013, FIFA took ultimately unsuccessful steps
toward hiring independent executives, including German Judge Hans-Joachim Eckert as
head of the adjudicatory chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee, former United States
Attorney Michael Garcia as head of the FIFA Ethics Committee’s investigatory chamber,
and additional independent executives in the roles of Chief Financial Officer and the heads
of the Governance and Audit & Compliance Committees. Bean, FIFA is Corruption,
supra note 93, at 249.
102 FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 58.
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protocol in regard to judicial review of FIFA conduct by subjecting
FIFA adjudicatory decisions to review in the federal court system103
– has one major flaw. The resulting system would give local courts,
with less than adequate expertise in the delicacies of sports-related
violations, the ultimate decision-making power on such matters.104
Additionally, allowing national courts to review FIFA adjudicatory
decisions would lead to inconsistent precedent across jurisdictional
lines.105 A more tenable solution would be to increase the appellate
role of CAS as a final review of FIFA adjudicatory decisions, which
has recently been implemented by the updated 2018 FIFA Code of
Ethics.106 The specific reform to the 2018 FIFA Code of Ethics
provides that “most of the decisions of the Ethics Committee may
[now] be appealed directly before CAS.”107 Similar difficulties
stemming from a lack of expertise in matters of sports law arise with
regard to Alexander Mandel’s call to establish an entirely
independent board of directors.108
Lastly, Professor Bruce W. Bean’s suggestion to amend the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA) to include FIFA on
its list of international organizations subject to the provisions of the
FCPA, which “criminalizes bribes paid to foreign officials,
including officials of ‘public international organizations,’”109 is
unlikely to resolve FIFA corruption with so simple a solution. In
particular, although FIFA’s addition to the FCPA list may reduce
some corrupt practices, any benefit gained in the battle against FIFA
corruption would not extend beyond transactions with the United
States,110 so this recommendation is inherently limited in its
implementation. Professor Bean’s later recommendations of Swiss
government action, pressure from host governments and sponsors,
103 Eghbal, supra note 86, at 402 (suggesting a “hearing examiner” independent of the
agency).
104 See Matthew J. Mitten, “Sports Law”: Implications for the Development of
International, Comparative, and National Law and Global Dispute Resolution, 85 TUL. L.
REV. 269, 292 (2010).
105 See id.
106 Amendments, supra note 12.
107 Id.
108 Mandel, supra note 94, at 476–77 (suggesting that an independent board of
directors will solve many of FIFA’s corruption issues).
109 Bean, An Interim Essay, supra note 90, at 390–91 (arguing that subjecting FIFA
to the FCPA could resolve corruption within FIFA).
110 See id. at 391.
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and action by the international community,111 may have some
success in holding FIFA and its officials accountable for corrupt
activities that have already occurred, but, without internal change,
that external pressure will likely fail to prevent further corruption.112
FIFA has implemented reform measures in an effort to combat
corruption.113 However, FIFA is still susceptible to further
corruption due to its own predominant control over internal reform,
limitations for external review of its practices, and limited
consequences for rule violations.114 Although organized under
Swiss law, FIFA is an international association that is almost
completely accountable to itself,115 which means there is inherent
potential for corruption to resurface even in the face of reform.
Currently, most external accountability to FIFA comes from CAS,
which works within FIFA rules and Swiss law, and only steps in as
an appellate force deciding issues after the fact, rather than
combatting corruption before it occurs.116 Additionally, the
limitation of few available aggressive disciplinary measures – most
aggressive being the ban from all football-related activity and, on
the other end of the spectrum, social work or the mild new addition
of compliance training117 – does not bode well in favor of
discouraging corrupt behavior by FIFA officials.
VII. Further Recommendations for FIFA Reform
An alternative, or at the very least a complement, to increasing
external review of FIFA affairs is an internal reform effort by FIFA
leadership to increase public transparency and promote an anticorruption culture. Corporate transparency and reporting generally
represents “a contentious area of anti-corruption work” for
Bean, FIFA Is Corruption, supra note 93, at 243.
FIFA reform will benefit the most from the combination of both external pressure,
such as the recent U.S. and Swiss investigations and the enhancement of Swiss anticorruption laws, and internal pressure, including leadership’s commitment to the
enforcement of FIFA reform measures and the implementation of additional reforms. See
Matthew B. Dicenso, A Long-Awaited Reboot: The FIFA Scandal and Its Repercussions
for Football’s Governing Body, 40 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 115, 134–38 (2017).
113 Amendments, supra note 12.
114 See generally Amendments, supra note 12; FIFA Statutes, supra note 32; FIFA
Disciplinary Code, supra note 49; FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 58.
115 See Amendments, supra note 12.
116 See FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 58, at 52.
117 See Amendments, supra note 12; FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 58, at 12.
111
112
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multinational corporations because “[t]ransparency can jeopardize
a company’s competitive position where much of its action and
strategy must be done away from the eyes of its competitors.”118
However, FIFA has been heralded as “the perfect global
monopoly”,119 which creates an opportunity for FIFA, an
unchallenged international sports association powerhouse, to set a
revolutionary industry standard of “unilateral transparency.”120
One way that FIFA could move toward unilateral transparency
is to focus on “corporate social reporting.”121 Social reporting
involves the disclosure of the processes that corporations use to
manage corporate social responsibility issues and their performance
on these matters, and “[w]ith this information, stakeholders . . . can
seek to hold corporations accountable and pressure them to improve
performance if needed.”122 If FIFA were to implement social
reporting practices intended to demystify FIFA affairs with
voluntary reports on the behind-the-scenes operations of the

118 Bryane Michael & Indira Carr, How Can the ICAC Help Foster the Widespread
Adoption of Company Anticorruption Programs in Hong Kong, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 355, 423 (2015).
119 Paul Mason, FIFA Was the Perfect Global Monopoly – And Its Crisis Is a Parable
about the Future of Capitalism, THE GUARDIAN (May 31, 2015, 8:00 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/31/fifa-corruption-crisis-globalmonopoly [https://perma.cc/3RZ9-C9MD].
120 Michael & Carr, supra note 118, at 423.
121 David Hess, Combating Corruption through Corporate Transparency: Using
Enforcement Discretion to Improve Disclosure, 21 MINN. J. INT’L L. 42, 53–54 (2012) (“In
policy debates centered around corporate accountability for social and environmental
performance, transparency is always part of the discussion, if not the default approach.
Often this transparency focuses on corporate social reporting – also known as
sustainability reporting or non-financial reporting.”).
122 Id. at 54. “Increasingly, other stakeholders, such as non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) and social investors, are also seeking information on corporate antibribery efforts so that they can serve as surrogate regulators, pressuring corporations to
live up to their anti-bribery commitments, as well as assisting them in those efforts. In
each of these ways, the development and use of new information can help to combat the
environments that allow corruption to thrive. A key first step in taking advantage of these
opportunities is conceptualizing anti-corruption as an issue of corporate social
responsibility (CSR), and not simply as an issue of legal compliance. Just a decade ago,
the topic of anti-corruption was excluded from many major CSR initiatives, but in the last
few years it has become a central topic. Viewing anti-corruption as an issue of CSR does
not mean that combating corruption is a purely elective activity, akin to corporate
philanthropy; it means that anti-corruption efforts involve acting consistent with ethical
values and it means taking actions that simultaneously create economic value for the
corporation and social value for society.” Id. at 44–45.
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international football association, continuous pressure from the
fans, players, middle management, and the remaining public may
be just enough to keep a lid on FIFA corruption.123 However, in
order for social reporting practices to be effective, FIFA must
commit to producing quality social reports with special emphasis
placed on curbing such concerns as “incompleteness of information
in the reports, . . . lack of consistency from year to year, [and] the
inability to compare social report data” with other comparable
international entities.124 Furthermore, public transparency must be
paired with the supporting influence of an anti-corruption culture
within FIFA governance.
Recasting FIFA’s internal affairs with a new anti-corruption
culture will be no easy feat. “Establishing a good corporate culture
takes thoughtful planning and thorough implementation of sound
policies and procedures, but fixing a broken corporate culture is
hard and painful, and regaining a lost reputation for integrity is
virtually impossible.”125
Rather than move forward with a complete upheaval of the FIFA
executive governance structure, this Note, as a start, recommends
that FIFA governance should embrace a mission of “high
performance, high integrity, and sound risk management,” as
recommended by Ben W. Heineman Jr., former General Counsel for
the major U.S. corporation General Electric, in his book The Inside
Counsel Revolution.126 Heineman’s “high performance, high
123 Per the recommended guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative, the reports
themselves may be broken down as follows: “The main body of the report consists of
disclosures addressed toward a corporation’s general management approach and toward
its performance with respect to various specified categories of economic, environmental,
and social issues. The ‘social’ category is sub-divided into categories on labor practices,
human rights, society, and product responsibility, and within the ‘society’ category are
three ‘core’ required metrics related to corruption. The reporting corporation must
disclose: (1) what business units it has analyzed for corruption risks; (2) the training
provided to employees on the corporation’s anti-corruption policies; and (3) how the
company has responded to any incidents of corruption related to its business activities. In
addition to these performance indicators, the GRI requires corporations to disclose their
general management approach to corruption. This includes disclosure of the corporation’s
policies on corruption, its operational responsibilities, and its monitoring procedures.” Id.
at 58–59.
124 Id. at 55.
125 Betsy P. Collins & Mignon Lunsford, 10 Corporate Culture Lessons from
Deutsche Bank, LAW 360 (May 19, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/656754/10corporate-culture-lessons-from-deutsche-bank.
126 Ben W. Heineman, Jr., THE INSIDE COUNSEL REVOLUTION RESOLVING THE

22

N.C. J. INT'L L.

[Vol. XLV

integrity, sound risk management” model was partly intended as a
tool to combat the corruption that had pervaded corporate culture in
the United States for decades, only to come to light with very public
scandals in the early 2000s.127 FIFA is both a governing body and
a business, and as such, FIFA leadership and employees are tempted
by the earning potential from shortcuts and corrupt practices in
much the same way that business leaders are tempted toward
misconduct in corporate practices.128 However, a strong and
consistent model of integrity and ethical practices encouraged by
FIFA leadership, as well as a thorough cleansing of FIFA
governance by disassociating the individuals with a tainted
reputation for corruption, will positively impact the internal culture
within FIFA.129
Implementing a “high integrity”130 mission for the international
football association should begin with taking steps toward
strengthening areas of FIFA that are vulnerable to employee and
governance misconduct.131 In an effort to ensure that both
governing officers and employees follow the “high integrity”132
mission, it is vital that all FIFA-affiliated personnel are “informed,
responsive and ethical.”133 FIFA “should promote and reward good
behavior, develop ethical statements and codes of conduct, . . . take
swift action to punish bad behavior[, and] . . . develop controls that
will prevent, or at least expose, bad conduct.”134 In light of FIFA
reform efforts already underway, including the FIFA Code of
Ethics’ incorporation of required compliance training as a potential

PARTNER-GUARDIAN TENSION 4 (ABA Publ’g 2016).
127 See generally id.
128 See Bill George, Why Leaders Lose Their Way, HARVARD BUS. S CH. WORKING
KNOWLEDGE (June 6, 2011), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/why-leaders-lose-their-way
[https://perma.cc/2RVY-MC59].
129 See generally Heineman, supra note 126 (discussing the role of ethical leadership
in improving internal corporate culture).
130 Id.
131 See Collins & Lunsford, supra note 125.
132 Heineman, supra note 126.
133 Collins & Lunsford, supra note 125.
134 Id.
One such control to help prevent, or at least expose, bad conduct will
necessarily include implementing a comprehensive whistleblower program within FIFA.
See Steven A. Bank, Reforming FIFA from the Inside Out, 52 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L.
265, 317–20 (2019).
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disciplinary measure135 and the existing “Duty to Report” described
in the FIFA Code of Ethics,136 FIFA has made strides in the right
direction toward recasting the FIFA culture as one focused on
preventing corruption. But change does not happen overnight. If
FIFA has any true chance of ridding international football of
corruption, a commitment to rooting out corruption must continue
indefinitely.
VIII. Conclusion
In combatting corruption, FIFA should place continued
emphasis on public transparency, which will provide a mechanism
of public pressure to encourage good behavior, and consider
amending the responsibilities of the existing FIFA governing
bodies. Doing so would allow for more stringent monitoring of
FIFA and its member institutions for violations of FIFA rules and
regulations and ensure adherence to the FIFA Code of Ethics.
Moving forward, if FIFA reform efforts are to have a lasting impact
on how FIFA leadership and individuals who work under the FIFA
umbrella interact with one other, FIFA governance and middle
management must focus on building an internal culture of
compliance, integrity, and public transparency.

135
136

Amendments, supra note 12.
FIFA Code of Ethics, supra note 58, at 17.
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